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Response inhibition is typically considered a hallmark of deliberate executive control. In this article, we
review work showing that response inhibition can also become a ‘prepared reﬂex’, readily triggered by
information in the environment, or after sufﬁcient training, or a ‘learned reﬂex’ triggered by the retrieval
of previously acquired associations between stimuli and stopping. We present new results indicating
that people can learn various associations, which inﬂuence performance in different ways. To account for
previous ﬁndings and our new results, we present a novel architecture that integrates theories of
associative learning, Pavlovian conditioning, and executive response inhibition. Finally, we discuss why
this work is also relevant for the study of ‘intentional inhibition’.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Few seem to doubt the importance of response inhibition for
optimal and goal-directed behaviour. Without the ability to stop
habitual or no-longer relevant actions, we would be slaves of our
past; we would be impulsive creatures that respond to any
potentially relevant stimulus that presents itself; and we would
not be able to respond adequately to changes in the environment.
Quite often, this would lead to terrible outcomes. One could even
say that we would be doomed without inhibition… At least, it
seems this way when you look at the pivotal role of response
inhibition in current theories of self-control. There is a vast
amount of cognitive and neuroscience literature that suggests that
response inhibition is one of the core ‘executive’ or ‘cognitive
control’ functions (Logan, 1994; Miyake et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof,
van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008d). Furthermore, work in psychiatry and clinical
psychology suggests that deﬁcits in response inhibition are asso-
ciated with various clinical disorders (Bari & Robbins, 2013;
Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009). It is not always obvious
whether the response inhibition deﬁcit is the cause or a conse-
quence of the disorder, but some longitudinal studies suggest that
the ability to stop one's actions can inﬂuence behavioural and
substance addictions later in life (e.g. Nigg et al., 2006). In this
article we will not dispute that response inhibition is a critical
aspect of cognitive and emotional functioning. However, we will
question the general idea that response inhibition is always a
deliberate act of control. We will demonstrate that learning to stop
can lead to automatisation of response inhibition. We focus
primarily on ‘external’ or ‘stimulus-driven’ response inhibition,
but also consider brieﬂy how this work can have implications for
the study of ‘intentional’ inhibition (Brass & Haggard, 2007, 2008;
Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012). We will review previous
research on ‘automatic’ inhibition and related topics, and present
new empirical material that speaks to the issues of what is learned
and how it is learned.
2. Response inhibition in the laboratory
Popular paradigms to study top-down or deliberate response
inhibition include the go/no-go paradigm and the stop-signal
paradigm. In the go/no-go paradigm, subjects are presented with
a series of stimuli and are told to respond when a go stimulus is
presented and to withhold their response when a no-go stimulus
is presented (e.g. press the response key for a square but do not
press the response key for a diamond). In the stop-signal para-
digm, subjects usually perform a choice reaction task on go trials
(e.g. press the left response key for a square and press the right
response key for a diamond). On a random selection of the trials
(stop trials), a stop signal (e.g. an auditory tone or a visual cue,
such as the outline of the go stimulus turning bold) is presented
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after a variable delay (stop-signal delay; SSD), which instructs
subjects to withhold the response to the go stimulus on those
trials. Popular variants of the stop-signal paradigm include the
countermanding task, in which eye movements have to be
cancelled (Schall & Boucher, 2007), and the stop-change task, in
which the cancelled response has to be replaced by another
response (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b).
Performance in response inhibition paradigms can be modelled
as an independent “horse race” between a go process, which is
triggered by the presentation of a go stimulus, and a stop process,
which is triggered by the presentation of the no-go stimulus or the
stop signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen,
& Wagenmakers, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). When the
stop process ﬁnishes before the go process, response inhibition is
successful and no response is emitted (signal-inhibit); when the go
process ﬁnishes before the stop process, response inhibition is
unsuccessful and the response is incorrectly emitted (signal-
respond). The latency of the stop process (stop-signal reaction
time or SSRT) is covert, but it can be estimated in the stop-signal
task (Logan & Cowan, 1984). SSRT has proven to be an important
measure of the cognitive control processes that are involved in
stopping (but see Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013, for a
cautionary note).
The independent race model of Logan & Cowan (1984) assumes
stochastic independence between the go and stop processes.
However, complete independence between the go and stop
processes is unlikely. Neuroscience studies indicate that going
and stopping interact in the basal ganglia (note that for the
inhibition of eye movements, the interaction seems to take place
in the frontal eye ﬁelds and the superior colliculus; see e.g. Schall
and Godlove (2012)). A motor response can be activated via the
direct cortical-subcortical pathway (Nambu, Tokuno, & Takada,
2002). This involves the activation of ‘Go’ cells in the striatum,
which inhibit the internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi);
this reduces inhibition of the thalamus, leading to the execution of
a motor response. But the execution can be cancelled via activation
of the indirect or hyperdirect pathways (Nambu et al., 2002). The
indirect pathway involves the activation of ‘No-go’ striatal cells,
which inhibit the external segment of the globus pallidus (GPe);
this reduces tonic inhibition between GPe and the GPi, resulting in
increased activity in GPi, and consequently, increased inhibition of
the thalamus. It is thought that this can lead to the selective
inhibition of a particular response (Aron & Verbruggen, 2008;
Smittenaar, Guitart-Masip, Lutti, & Dolan, 2013). The downside of
this pathway is that inhibition may be relatively slow (Aron, 2011;
Aron & Verbruggen, 2008). Fast but global response inhibition
could be achieved via a third pathway, namely the hyperdirect
pathway (Aron et al., 2007; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). This involves
activation of the subthalamic nucleus, which has in turn a broad
effect on GPi, leading to global suppression of the thalamus.
Computationally, the interaction between the go and stop pro-
cesses can be described by the interactive race model (Boucher,
Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007). In this model, the go process is
initiated by the go stimulus and a go representation is activated
after an afferent delay. The stop process is initiated by the stop
signal and a stop representation is activated after an afferent delay.
Once the stop representation is activated, it inhibits go processing
strongly and quickly. In this interactive race model, SSRT primarily
reﬂects the period before the stop unit is activated, during which
stop and go processings are independent, so its predictions
correspond to those of the independent race model (Logan &
Cowan, 1984).
Most research on response inhibition focuses on ‘reactive’ control
processes after a no-go or stop signal is presented. However,
successful performance in inhibition tasks requires ﬁnding a balance
between going quickly on go trials and withholding a response on
no-go or stop trials (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). Reaction time (RT)
is typically longer in blocks in which stop signals can occur than in
blocks in which no stop signals can occur. Several researchers have
argued that this slowing reﬂects ‘proactive’ control adjustments:
when subjects expect a no-go or stop signal, they adjust attentional
settings, increase response thresholds, or proactively suppress all
motor outputs to prevent premature responses (e.g. Aron, 2011;
Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009c; Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 2014; Zandbelt,
Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2013). Inter- and intra-
individual differences in proactive control may inﬂuence overall
stopping performance. Therefore, proactive control is an important
avenue for future research. But in this paper, we will highlight
another aspect of response inhibition, namely the impact of priming
and learning on performance.
3. Inhibition as a primed or prepared reﬂex
Most researchers assume that response inhibition in the go/no-
go and stop-signal paradigms is a goal-driven and deliberate act of
control. But in a series of studies, Van Gaal et al. demonstrated that
response inhibition could be triggered by low-visibility primes in
both the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms. In their studies, they
contrasted no-go or stop trials on which the brieﬂy presented no-
go or stop signal was masked, with go trials without a signal and
with no-go or stop trials without a mask. Behaviourally, they
found that the presentation of low-visibility no-go or stop-signals
slowed down responding and increased the percentage of missed
responses slightly (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, &
Lamme, 2008; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, &
Lamme, 2009; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010;
van Gaal, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011). They attrib-
uted this pattern to the ‘unconscious’ activation of the response
inhibition network (but see Newell and Shanks (2014) for general
concerns about procedures to assess consciousness)1. In the stop-
signal experiments, the slowing seemed to increase over practice
(van Gaal et al., 2009, 2011), suggesting that there was a learning
component to the priming effect. The idea that the response
inhibition network could be primed was further supported by
a comparison between the low-visibility primes and the high-
visibility no-go/stop signals. More speciﬁcally, the low-visibility
primes elicited activation in frontal regions that are typically
associated with deliberate, top-down inhibition (van Gaal et al.,
2008, 2010), although it should be noted that there were some
differences as well (van Gaal et al., 2011). Importantly, the
activation of this ‘unconscious inhibition network’ correlated
positively with the degree of slowing.
In one of our own studies we demonstrated that stopping could
also be primed by task-irrelevant (highly visible) features
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In a series of experiments, we
presented the primes GO, ♯♯♯, or STOP inside stimuli (circles or
squares). In Experiment 1, subjects were instructed to respond to
the shape (e.g. circle¼ left, and square¼right) but to withhold the
response when an auditory stop signal was presented. They were
instructed to ignore the primes in the go stimulus. Even though
the words were always irrelevant, we found that reaction times on
go trials were signiﬁcantly longer for STOP than for ♯♯♯ and GO
primes; there was no reliable difference between ♯♯♯ and GO
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In another experiment, GO, #♯♯, or
STOP were presented as stop signals. Subjects were told to inhibit
the go response whenever any of these stimuli appeared. An
1 Newell and Shanks argued that identiﬁcation or classiﬁcation tasks, such as
the ones used by Van Gaal et al., are not sensitive enough to assess awareness.
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analysis of stop-signal reaction times revealed that stop perfor-
mance was slower for GO than for ♯♯♯ or STOP (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009a). Combined, these ﬁndings suggest that task goals,
such as going and stopping, can be primed and that response
inhibition and executive control can be inﬂuenced by automatic
processing2. However, the priming effects were inﬂuenced by task
context; the ‘STOP’ prime slowed responding on go trials in a stop-
signal task or a go/no-go task, but not in a task in which subjects
could always respond (go-only task) (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a,
Experiment 2). In other words, ‘STOP’ primed the stop goal in only
in conditions in which the goal was relevant to the task context.
Note that Chiu and Aron have shown that the effects of low-
visibility primes may also be context-dependent (Chiu & Aron,
2014; but see Lin and Murray (2014), who raised some methodo-
logical concerns about their priming manipulation). Finally, con-
tingent involuntary response inhibition was also demonstrated by
Anderson and Folk (2012, 2014), who found that ﬂankers that
share the colour of a no-go stimulus could suppress motor
responses. They also concluded that response inhibition can be
automatically triggered by a stimulus based on top-down goals.
These priming studies suggest that stopping or inhibitory control
may not require high levels of awareness. It may even be an
automatic act of control, triggered by the presentation of irrelevant
stimulus features. However, the context effects demonstrate the
bottom-up and top-down acts of control interact. Indeed, it is
possible that inhibitory control became a ‘prepared reﬂex’ in those
studies discussed above. We have recently reviewed the action
control literature, which demonstrates that people can proactively
allocate attention to a speciﬁc location or to a speciﬁc stimulus
feature, proactively select an action, or prepare a movement
(Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). When attention is
preallocated or a response is prepared, goal-directed actions may
not require much control anymore (Hommel, 2000; Logan, 1978;
Meiran, Cole, & Braver, 2012); instead, actions can be activated
easily by stimuli in the environment (Chiu & Aron, 2013; van Gaal et
al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), even when they are inappropriate
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). We consider response inhibition to
be a speciﬁc form of action control (Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, &
Chambers, 2010; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014), which involves
the selection of a stop response rather than another go response.
Therefore, it seems plausible that both going and stopping can
become a ‘prepared’ reﬂex (Hommel, 2000; Logan, 1978; Meiran
et al., 2012; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Note that the
‘prepared reﬂex’ account overlaps strongly with the ‘implementa-
tion intention’ idea (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Implemen-
tation intentions refer to the linking of critical situations or cues to
speciﬁc actions (e.g. ‘Whenever I see an unhealthy food item, I will
not buy it’). This could lead to a prepared reﬂex; indeed, Gollwitzer
noted that after implementation intentions are formed, ‘action
initiation becomes swift, efﬁcient, and does not require conscious
intent’ (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 495).
4. Response inhibition as a learned reﬂex
In the previous section, we explored the idea that response
inhibition could become a ‘prepared’ reﬂex. The studies reviewed
suggest an interaction between bottom-up and top-down pro-
cesses. But is top-down control required at all? It is well documen-
ted that responding to a stimulus or cue can become ‘automatised’
over practice (Dickinson, 1985; Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Given that we consider response
inhibition to be similar to response execution in many ways, it
naturally follows that we hypothesise response inhibition can also
become ‘automatised’ over practice. In this section, we will review
some works that suggest response inhibition can indeed become a
‘learned’ reﬂex, easily triggered by the retrieval of acquired stimu-
lus–stop associations.
4.1. Sequential effects of stopping
After a stop trial, response latencies generally increase. This post-
signal slowing is more pronounced when the stimulus or stimulus
category of the previous trial is repeated (Bissett & Logan, 2011;
Enticott, Bradshaw, Bellgrove, Upton, & Ogloff, 2009; Oldenburg,
Roger, Assecondi, Verbruggen, & Fias, 2012; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999;
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2008c; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, &
Vandierendonck, 2008). We have attributed this stimulus-speciﬁc
slowing to the retrieval of stimulus–stop associations: a go stimulus
becomes associated with a ‘stop’ representation on a stop trial; when
it is repeated on the next go trial, the stop representation is activated
via associative retrieval, and this will suppress the go response. This
idea is related to the ‘do-not-respond tag’ account of the negative
priming effect of Neill et al. (Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill, Valdes, Terry,
& Gorfein, 1992). Negative priming refers to the ﬁnding that after
a stimulus has appeared as a distractor in congruency tasks such as a
picture-naming task or an Eriksen ﬂanker task, responding to it on
the next trial is usually impaired. Neill et al. proposed that a
distractor becomes associated with a do-not-respond representation;
when it is repeated on the next trial as a target, the do-not-respond
association is activated via associative retrieval, and this will interfere
with responding. It is no coincidence that our ‘stimulus–stop
association’ account and Neill’s ‘do-not-respond tag’ account overlap,
as both are explicitly based on the Instance Theory (Logan, 1988).
Logan suggested that every time people respond to a stimulus,
processing episodes are stored as instances in memory. These
episodes consist of the stimulus (e.g. a shape), the interpretation
given to a stimulus (e.g. ‘square’), the task goal (‘shape judgment’),
and the response (‘left’). When the stimulus is repeated, previous
processing episodes are retrieved, facilitating performance if the
retrieved information is consistent with the currently relevant
information but impairing performance if the retrieved information
is inconsistent. On a stop trial, the go stimulus or stimulus category
becomes associated with stopping; when the stimulus (or category)
is repeated, the stimulus–stop association is retrieved, and this
interferes with responding on go trials. The idea here, then, is that
the go response/goal and the stop response/goal are mutually
inhibitory (cf. Boucher et al. (2007)).
A recent study has shown that stimulus features that are not
relevant to the current task goal can also become associated with
a stop representation (Giesen & Rothermund, 2014). In their
Experiment 1, Giesen and Rothermund used a prime-probe design
in which subjects had to press the space bar whenever a word
appeared. The identity of the word was always irrelevant. Never-
theless, they found that stopping the response on the prime trial
delayed responding on the probe trial if the prime word was
repeated. This suggested that the word was associated with
stopping, even though its identity was never relevant. In a second
experiment, they demonstrated that responding was delayed even
when the prime and probe response were different. In this
experiment, the colour of a letter indicated whether subjects had
to execute a left or right response; the identity of the letter (‘D’ or
‘L’) was irrelevant. Giesen and Rothermund found that responding
to a letter was slowed down if a stop signal was presented on the
prime trial, regardless of the ‘to-be-executed’ or ‘to-be-stopped’
response (e.g. a green D on the prime, followed by a red D). This
suggests that the stimulus–stop associations may have a global
effect on responding.
2 We assumed that priming reﬂected automatic and unintentional processing
because the identity of the primes never predicted whether subjects needed to go
or stop or which go response they should make (Tzelgov, 1997).
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4.2. Response inhibition as an automatic act of control?
The stimulus–stop effects are observed up to 20 trials after the
presentation of the stop signal (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c).
Similar long-term effects have been observed in task-switching
studies, suggesting that stimuli can become associated with tasks
or task goals (Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport,
2003, 2004, 2005). Such long-term associations may support the
development of ‘automatic’ response inhibition. Instance-based
accounts of automatisation attribute automaticity to retrieval of
stored instances3, which will occur after practice in a consistent
environment (Logan, 1988). The repetition priming effects could be
a ﬁrst step towards automatisation (Logan, 1990). In a series of
experiments, we examined the idea that inhibitory control in go/
no-go and stop-signal tasks can be triggered automatically via the
retrieval of stimulus–stop associations from memory (Verbruggen
& Logan, 2008b). Initially, we used go/no-go tasks in which the
stimulus category deﬁned whether subjects had to respond (e.g.
living objects¼go) or not (e.g. non-living objects¼no-go). We
trained subjects to stop their response to a speciﬁc stimulus, and
then reversed the go/no-go mappings in a test phase. In this test
phase, subjects were slower to respond to that stimulus compared
with stimuli that they had not seen before (Verbruggen & Logan,
2008b, Experiment 1). This slowing was still observed when the
tasks changed from training to test: subjects made living/non-
living judgements in training but large/small judgments in test (or
vice versa; Experiment 2), and RTs were longer for inconsistent
items (i.e. no-go in one task but go in the other task) than for
consistent items (i.e. go in both tasks). Again, this is consistent
with ﬁndings in task-switching literature. For example, Pösse,
Waszak, and Hommel (2006) have demonstrated that stimulus–
response associations could survive one or more task switches.
Based on these ﬁndings, we proposed the automatic inhibition
hypothesis: ‘automatic inhibition’ occurs when old no-go stimuli
retrieve the stop goal when they are repeated, and this interferes
with go processing (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). Stimulus–stop
mapping is typically consistent in the go/no-go paradigm, so automatic
inhibition is likely to occur. However, automatic inhibition can also
occur in the stop-signal task when the mapping is manipulated. In the
training phase of Experiment 5 of Verbruggen and Logan (2008b),
a subset of the stimuli was consistently associated with stopping or
going, and another subset was inconsistently associated with stopping
and going, as is typical in stop-signal experiments. In the test phase,
the stimulus–stop and stimulus–go mappings were reversed for
consistent stimuli. Consistent with the go/no-go experiments, we
found that responding was slowed down for items that always
occurred on stop trials in the training phase.
The stop-signal experiment of Verbruggen and Logan (2008b)
suggests that even in the stop-signal task, response inhibition is not
always an effortful or deliberate act of control. As discussed in more
detail below, similar behavioural results were obtained in a neu-
roimaging study of automatic inhibition (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen,
Logan, & Poldrack, 2011). However, slowing may not have been
caused by associative retrieval in these experiments but by sequen-
tial dependencies. Due to the stimulus–stop manipulation and the
ﬁxed overall probability of stop signals, an old stop item (which was
always ‘go’ in test) was more likely to follow a stop trial than the
control items (which were ‘go’ or ‘stop’) in the test phase. As
mentioned above, responding generally increases after a stop trial;
this slowing can reﬂect top-down shifts in goal priorities (Bissett &
Logan, 2011). Furthermore, subjects can detect even small statistical
regularities in sequential designs (e.g. Yeates, Jones, Wills, McLaren,
& McLaren, 2012). Therefore, we have conducted an experiment to
check whether the response slowing for old stop items is due to
top-down goal-shifts or sequential learning rather than bottom-up
factors. A detailed description of the procedure and the results can
be found in Appendix A. There were two groups: an experimental
group and a control group. Subjects in the experimental group
made speeded semantic categorisations (living/non-living) on a
series of words. On some trials (stop trials) an additional signal
was presented, instructing subjects to withhold their planned
response (see Fig. 1). Each word was presented ﬁve times within
the block; the ﬁrst four presentations were ‘training’ or acquisition
trials, the ﬁfth and ﬁnal presentation was the ‘test’ trial. There were
four stimulus types within each block that occurred with equal
Fig. 1. Example of a trial sequence in the stop-learning paradigm that is used to check whether the response slowing for old stop items is due to top-down goal-shifts or
sequential learning rather than bottom-up factors. The stop-then-go and stop/go-then-go words are depicted; the ﬁrst four presentations are the training phase, and the ﬁfth
presentation is the test phase. The distinction between the training and test phase is for illustration only, as subjects are not informed about this distinction. FIX¼duration of
the ﬁxation interval; SSD¼stop-signal delay; MAXRT¼maximum reaction time (see Appendix A for further details).
3 Instance Theory construes automaticity as a memory phenomenon: ‘Auto-
maticity is memory retrieval: Performance is automatic when it is based on single-
step direct-access retrieval of past solutions from memory. The [Instance Theory]
assumes that novices begin with a general algorithm that is sufﬁcient to perform
the task. As they gain experience, they learn speciﬁc solutions to speciﬁc problems,
which they retrieve when they encounter the same problems again. Then, they can
respond with the solution retrieved from memory or the one computed by the
algorithm. At some point, they may gain enough experience to respond with a
solution from memory on every trial and abandon the algorithm entirely. At that
point, their performance is [completely] automatic’ (Logan, 1988, p. 493).
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probability. ‘Stop-then-go’ items always occurred on stop trials
during training, but occurred on a go trial in the test phase (stop–
stop–stop–stop–go). ‘Stop/go-then-go’ items occurred with equal
probability on stop and go trials during training (50%) but the order
was otherwise random; they always occurred on a go trial in the
test phase (e.g. go–stop–go–stop–go). Other stimuli in the block
were the ‘stop/go-then-stop’ (e.g. go–stop–go–stop–stop) and the
‘go-then-stop’ (go–go–go–go–stop) items. Hence, the overall prob-
ability of a stop trial was 0.5. New words were used in each block to
prevent re-learning. Subjects in the control group made the same
speeded semantic categorisations, but no items were consistently
associated with stopping or going in the training phase. For each
subject in the control group, the signal sequence was yoked to the
signal sequence of a subject in the experimental group. This allowed
us to test whether effects in the experimental group were due to
item-speciﬁc learning or effects of the stop-signal sequence.
The main result of this ‘sequential dependencies’ experiment is
shown in Fig. 2 (see Appendix A for a full overview of the
descriptive and inferential statistics). We found an interaction
between stimulus type and group in the test phase (p¼0.015;
Table A3). Planned comparisons showed that subjects in the
experimental group were slower to respond to stop-then-go items,
which were consistently associated with stopping in the training
phase, than to stop/go-then-go items in the test phase (mean
difference: 25 ms; t(20)¼3.11, p¼0.005, Cohen's dz¼0.68). This is
consistent with the ‘automatic inhibition’ hypothesis. Importantly,
there was no signiﬁcant difference between these two items in
the test phase of the control group (mean difference: 7.6 ms;
t(20)¼0.763, p¼0.45, Cohen's dz¼0.16). This indicates that the
slowing observed in the experimental group is not due to general
(non-stimulus speciﬁc) sequential effects because the overall
signal sequence is the same in the experimental and control
groups. There were no other signiﬁcant interactions between
stimulus type and group (see Table A3). The difference in the
experimental group is consistent with our previous ﬁndings:
reaction times are longer for items that are associated with
stopping. Importantly, the absence of a difference in the control
group indicates that the slowing for old stop items is not due to
general (non-stimulus speciﬁc) sequential effects.
To conclude, responding to items that are associated with
stopping is slowed. We have attributed this slowing to the retrieval
of stimulus–stop associations from memory, making response
inhibition an automatic act of control. Our novel experiment
reported in this section provides a replication of our earlier ﬁndings
and demonstrates that the slowing is not due to non-stimulus
speciﬁc sequential effects. In the next sections, we will explore the
neural mechanisms of ‘automatic inhibition’ and discuss what is
learned when people withhold their response.
4.3. The cognitive neuroscience of automatic inhibition
Only a few studies have examined the neural substrates of
automatic inhibition. Lenartowicz et al. (2011) used neuroimaging
to study the neural mechanisms underpinning automatic inhibition.
On Day 1, subjects made gender judgments (male/female) about
face stimuli. In some trials, a tone was presented, requiring
participants to withhold their response. Unbeknown to the subjects,
some faces always occurred on stop-signals. On Day 2, subjects
performed the task in the scanner. The ﬁrst two blocks were
training blocks, to refresh the subjects' memory. Then the mapping
was reversed and the old stop faces became go faces. Behaviourally,
it was found that during training stop performance was better for
the consistent stop faces than for faces that could occur on both go
and stop trials. But in the test phase, go performance was impaired
for these old stop faces. Thus, stop–stimulus associations had the
effect of slowing down RTs on go trials and increasing accuracy on
stop trials, consistent with our other ﬁndings. Neurally, it was found
that the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) was activated upon the
presentation of the old stop faces in the test phase (Lenartowicz et
al., 2011). The rIFG is generally considered to play a key role in top-
down response inhibition (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004, 2014;
Chambers et al., 2009), although the precise role of the area is still
debated. The results of Lenartowicz et al. suggest that in addition to
being activated in response to explicit stop signals, it may also be
possible that the rIFG, and possibly other regions in the fronto-
striatal network, can be activated automatically on go trials. This is
similar to the ﬁndings of van Gaal et al. (2010), who showed that
both high- and low-visibility stop signals activated a similar cluster
in the right inferior frontal cortex. However, which control func-
tions are inﬂuenced by learning or priming is less clear because the
rIFG has been associated with a multitude of roles, including
context monitoring, response selection and reversal learning. For
example, rIFG could have been activated to deal with the higher
response selection demands after reversal.
Chiu, Aron, and Verbruggen (2012) used transcranial magnetic
stimulation to probe the excitability of motor cortex after practi-
cing stimulus–stop associations in a go/no-go task. This study
showed that motor excitability was suppressed a mere 100 ms
after the presentation of stimuli that were previously associated
with no-go, but now required going. This seems consistent with
the idea that stimuli can automatically activate the fast hyperdirect
pathway, independent of the task instructions. Surprisingly, this
reduction was not observed in a condition in which no-go items
were always associated with no-go throughout training and test.
This can indicate that the effects of stimulus–stop on the motor
cortex are context-dependent (Chiu et al., 2012). However, it could
also indicate that the decreased motor excitability for inconsistent
items was driven (at least partly) by conﬂict between competing
goal or response representations4. Some have argued that a global
inhibition mechanism is activated to suppress all motor responses
Fig. 2. Mean reaction time (RT) in the test phase of the sequence control
experiment. Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
4 On consistent no-go trials, there could be some conﬂict between the required
no-go response and the prepotent go response. However, the amount of conﬂict is
presumably lower on consistent trials than on inconsistent trials.
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when conﬂict between alternative actions is detected (Frank,
2006; Wiecki & Frank, 2013); this global mechanism would
effectively allow the system to prevent premature responses and
to select the appropriate response. The detection of conﬂict would
trigger the global braking mechanism via the hyperdirect pathway,
and this can explain the reduced motor excitability when the
mapping is reversed. In other words, the main difference between
the ‘automatic suppression’ account and the ‘conﬂict’ account is
the trigger of the braking or stopping mechanism: the stimulus
itself or the conﬂict caused by the retrieved information, respec-
tively. Initially we had doubts about the likelihood that conﬂict
could be detected early enough to cause reduced motor evoked
potentials (MEPs; Chiu et al., 2012); furthermore, MEPs were lower
for old stop items on a go trial than for old go items on a no-go
trial. However, the goal- or response-conﬂict account receives
some support from the short-term after-effect literature. As dis-
cussed above, a go stimulus may become associated with a ‘stop’
representation on a stop trial; when it is repeated on the next go
trial, the stop representation will be activated via associative
retrieval. This will interfere with responding on a go trial. . An
event-related potentials (ERPs) study has demonstrated that
stopping on the previous trial affected the stimulus-locked parietal
P300, but only when the stimulus was repeated (Oldenburg et al.,
2012). Response-locked motor components were not inﬂuenced in
this study. This suggests that stimulus-speciﬁc response slowing
after a stop trial is not caused directly by ‘automatic’ suppression
of motor output, but by interference between a stop and a go goal.
4.4. Learning associations between stimuli and signals
In a recent study, we have demonstrated that signal detection
processes are an important part of both reactive and proactive
response inhibition (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). Computa-
tional work even suggests that most of SSRT is occupied by
afferent or detection processes (Boucher et al., 2007; Salinas &
Stanford, 2013). Based on this literature, it seems plausible that
subjects may learn about the stop signal and build up links
between the stimulus and the stop signal (or the no-go signal in
experiments in which the go and no-go signals are superimposed
on the stimuli). When no-go/stop items (i.e. items such as images
or word associated with no-go or stopping) are presented, they
can activate a representation of the no-go/stop signal, which
activates the stopping network.
Research on learning and Pavlovian conditioning provides some
support for the stimulus–signal learning idea. In Pavlovian con-
ditioning, a conditioned stimulus (e.g. a bell) and an unconditioned
stimulus (e.g. the delivery of food) usually occur one after the other.
After practice the conditioned stimulus can activate the conditioned
response (e.g. salivation) via this CS-US link, or directly via a CS-R
link (Hall, 2002). Stimulus–signal learning is also exactly what the
associative APECS model would predict (McLaren, Forrest, &
McLaren, 2012; McLaren, 1993, 2011). APECS is a two-layer back-
propagation connectionist network that can learn associations;
it does this by selecting ‘mediating units’ to carry mappings
between input and output (for an application of APECS to task
switching, see Forrest, Monsell, and McLaren (2014)). These units
have dynamically parameterised biases (in effect these play the role
of thresholds) that control how easily a mediating unit can be
activated by input as a result of their associative history. Thus, the
system serves as a substrate for an associative memory that can
vary the accessibility of what is learned in an adaptive manner. This
allows it to produce priming effects as well as direct inﬂuences on
behaviour. Recent versions of the model can act as an auto-
associator, allowing stimuli that co-occur to associate with one
another via a mediating representation. In the context of stop-signal
experiments, the idea is that the go stimulus and stop signal
representations jointly activate the mediating unit which then
activates the stop system.
The possibility that subjects can learn various associations may
explain discrepancies between studies. To further study the neural
mechanisms of automatic inhibition using neuroimaging, we
recently conducted a neuroimaging study using the paradigm of
the ‘sequential dependencies’ experiment reported above (Fig. 1).
A detailed description of the procedure and the behavioural results
of this neuroimaging experiment can be found in Appendix B.
Subjects performed the semantic categorisation task on two con-
secutive days in the scanner. Like in the ‘sequential dependencies’
experiment, each word was presented ﬁve times within the block;
the ﬁrst four presentations were ‘training’ or acquisition trials, the
ﬁfth and ﬁnal presentation was the ‘test’ trial. The four stimulus
types (‘stop-then-go’, ‘stop/go-then-go’, ‘stop/go-then-stop’, and the
‘go-then-stop’) occurred with equal probability, and new words
were used in each block. There was no control group in this
experiment. Due to a few technical issues and the unanticipated
behavioural pattern, we will focus on the behavioural effects only.
Fig. 3. Mean RTs and p(respond|signal) as a function of stimulus type and stimulus
presentation (1–5; X-axis). Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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The main results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 3 (see
Appendix B for a full overview of the descriptive and inferential
statistics). Contrary to our expectations, responding was not
slower for the stop-then-go words (657 ms) than for the stop/
go-then-go words (660 ms) in the test phase, p¼0.634 (Table B3).
This result is inconsistent with the ﬁndings of the ‘sequential
dependencies’ experiment reported in Section 4.2, and suggests
that subjects do not learn stimulus–stop associations. However,
the analysis of p(respond|signal) data indicate that learning did
inﬂuence performance in the training phase. As expected, there
was no difference in the p(respond|signal) between the words on
the ﬁrst presentation (Fig. 3; Table A2), but a difference between
the stop-then-go (0.28) words and the stop/go-then-n (0.31)
words emerged throughout training (i.e. stimulus presentations
2–4). The difference between the stop-then-go and stop/go-then-n
words was reliable (p¼0.042; Table B3). In other words, we found
evidence of learning during training in the p(respond|signal) but
no effect in RTs upon the reversal of the consistent stimulus–stop
mappings. We propose that this pattern of results indicates that
subjects learned stimulus–signal associations rather than stimulus–
stop associations. Such associations between the stop items (i.e.
the stop-then-go words) and the stop signal (i.e. the line turning
bold) will prime the representation of the stop-signal detection
rather than the stop goal or stop response. This can explain why
learning inﬂuences the probability of stopping in training without
inﬂuencing responding on go trials in test. We are currently
exploring why some paradigms or experiments lead to stimulus–
signal learning, stimulus–stop learning, or both.
In sum, our theoretical analysis and the ﬁndings of the experi-
ment reported in this section suggests that, at least in some
paradigms, stimuli can become associated with stop signals or
a ‘mediating unit’ that carries the mapping between the stimulus
(cue) and stop signal. The stopping network could then become
activated via this S–S or S–unit link. The effect of associative
learning on perception and associative learning could also help us
to provide a more detailed explanation of some other ﬁndings. For
example, Manuel et al. documented that following performance of
an auditory go/no-go task, the topography of auditory-evoked
potentials was modulated within 80 ms of presenting no-go
stimuli previously consistently associated with stopping (Manuel,
Grivel, Bernasconi, Murray, & Spierer, 2010). They attributed this to
the development of ‘automatic inhibition’ (broadly deﬁned). Our
analysis suggests that this effect can be due to associative
processes inﬂuencing detection of the no-go stimulus (rather than
direct activation of an inhibition or no-go network).
4.5. Expectancy and awareness of the stop associations
In the studies of van Gaal et al. (van Gaal et al., 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011), subjects were reportedly unaware of the presentation
of the low-visibility primes (but see Footnote 1). In most go/no-go
experiments reported above, the stimulus-no-go rules were expli-
cit. By contrast, the rules were implicit in the stop-signal studies.
This raises the question whether subjects were also unaware of the
stimulus–stop associations in these studies. Whether or not
subjects were aware of them could have theoretical implications.
In the associative-learning literature, there is an ongoing debate as
to whether learning associations between a stimulus and an action
is rule-based or based on the formation of speciﬁc stimulus–
response associations (McLaren et al., 2014; Mitchell, De Houwer,
& Lovibond, 2009). Furthermore, awareness of the stimulus–stop
association can indicate that the response slowing observed for old
stop items is due to proactive control, rather than ‘automatic
inhibition’. When a cue [e.g. ‘p(stop-signal) ¼0.75’] indicates that
a stop signal is likely to occur on the following trial(s), subjects
proactively slow their responses (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c).
Stimuli associated with stopping could act as such cues (e.g. ‘if
stimulus X then p(stop) is high’), and subjects would adjust their
response strategies accordingly. The studies of Chiu et al. and
Manuel et al. (see above) indicate that strategies would have to be
adjusted very quickly (within 100 ms), making it at least a very
efﬁcient, acquired, form of top-down control. However, the ‘auto-
matic inhibition as a form of proactive control’ account fails to
explain why associatively mediated effects are still observed when
the go/no-go rules are explicit and subjects are informed about the
rule change (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, Experiments 1–4).
Furthermore, in a recent study (Verbrugen, Best, Stevens, &
McLaren, 2014), we used a modiﬁed version of the paradigm of
Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), which was speciﬁcally devel-
oped to examine effects of proactive control in the stop-signal
task. We found that subjects learned associations between speciﬁc
items and stopping in this paradigm, but that this did not interact
with measures of proactive control. These results are inconsistent
with the ‘automatic inhibition as a form of proactive control’
account. Instead, they suggests that stopping can indeed become
an automatic act of control, triggered by the retrieval of associa-
tions from memory.
It is also important to stress that awareness of a stimulus–stop
association does not necessarily indicate that inhibition is not
automatic. For example, Tzelgov argued that the deﬁning feature
of non-automatic processing is ‘monitoring’ and not awareness. In
this context, monitoring refers to ‘the intentional setting of the
goal of behaviour and to intentional evaluation of the outcome of
the process’ (Tzelgov, 1997, p. 444). He argues that all psycholo-
gical processes return some symbolic representation in humans, so
the organism will be ‘conscious’ or ‘aware’ of most behaviour,
including automatic processing. Thus, awareness should not be
used to distinguish between automatic and non-automatic proces-
sing. We have also recently hypothesised that similar learning
mechanisms may underlie rule-based behaviour and stimulus–
response link-based behaviour (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014).
The main difference between the two is the kind of representation
that is linked with the stimulus: an abstract, rule-like representa-
tion (X–‘if x then left’), or more concrete stimulus–response
associations (X–left). In other words, even if subjects are aware
of the contingencies, this does not necessarily imply that an
entirely different form of learning has taken place compared with
situations in which subjects were not aware of the contingencies.
In sum, we think it is unlikely that proactive adjustments
triggered by the presentation of an old stop item can account for
all ﬁndings reported above. However, more systematic research is
needed to determine whether subjects learn speciﬁc stimulus–
(stop)response associations or more abstract rules that can be
monitored.
4.6. Conditioned inhibition vs. conditioned inhibitory control
We claim that response inhibition can become associatively
mediated. Stimuli or items that are reliably paired with stopping
can prime and potentiate that act of control, and may even be able
to instigate it in their own right. In learning-theory terms, one
could say that response inhibition or inhibitory control becomes
‘conditioned’. But there is another type of conditioned inhibition,
which has been studied in animals. A viable recipe for producing
‘conditioned inhibition’ in animals is to use a design such as
AþAB , which simply denotes trials where A (e.g. a light) and an
unconditioned stimulus (US; e.g. the delivery of food or a shock)
are paired, interspersed with trials where A and B (e.g. a tone)
occur in compound but without the US. The result is that B
acquires the properties of being hard to condition to that US
(i.e. it passes the retardation test for a conditioned inhibitor), and
of suppressing excitatory responding when presented in compound
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with A or with another excitatory CS that has been conditioned with
the same US (i.e. it passes the summation test for conditioned
inhibition). Our recent theoretical analysis suggests that ‘condi-
tioned inhibition’ and ‘conditioned inhibitory control’ show some
important similarities (McLaren & Verbruggen, 2014).
Our review of the animal-learning literature shows that two
types of associations can be learned during conditioned inhibition
(McLaren & Verbruggen, 2014; see also e.g. Hall (2002), Dickinson
and Balleine (2002)). First, animals can learn a speciﬁc inhibitory
association between the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the US,
which suppresses the US representation (Konorski, 1948). The
basic idea here is that an inhibitory association is simply a negative
excitatory one. This type of associative structure emerges naturally
from the Rescorla–Wagner view of conditioning (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972), and from the idea that inhibition is the conse-
quence of a disconﬁrmed expectation of an outcome. In essence,
the contingencies involved in the AþAB training lead to the
development of the excitatory connection from the representation
of A (e.g. light) to the US representation (e.g. food), and the
inhibitory connection from the representation of B (e.g. tone) to
that same US representation. Thus, excitation is simply the con-
verse of inhibition and vice versa5. Second, animals can learn an
excitatory link from the ‘B’ representation to a ‘No-US’ centre or
representation that then inhibits the US representation (e.g.
Dickinson & Dearing, 1979; Konorski, 1967; Le Pelley, 2004;
Pearce & Hall, 1980). The key difference between this structure
and the earlier one is the use of this ‘No-US’ representation, which
is susceptible to at least two different interpretations. In one
(initially favoured by Konorski) the representation is US-speciﬁc,
and so, in the case where A is trained with food pellets, the No-US
representation would be ‘No food pellets’, but in the case where
A is trained with sucrose, the No-US representation would be ‘No
sucrose’. The other approach is that all conditioning is either
appetitive or aversive, and that there are “centres” corresponding
to this that mutually inhibit one another (Dickinson & Balleine,
2002; Dickinson & Dearing, 1979; Konorski, 1967). Support for this
idea comes from transreinforcer blocking and countercondition-
ing. For example, Dickinson and Dearing (1979) showed that
training B to be an inhibitor for a food US (i.e. the presentation
of B predicted the absence of food) enabled it to successfully block
learning involving a shock US (for other related ﬁndings, see
Dickinson and Balleine (2002)). In another study, Dickinson and
Lovibond (1982) (as cited in Dickinson and Balleine (2002))
demonstrated that a conditioned appetitive jaw movement could
be suppressed by an aversive defensive eye-blink in rabbits;
because rabbits can usually blink and swallow at the same time,
this interference was attributed to an inhibitory interaction
between an appetitive centre and an aversive centre. These centres
can function as the US and No-US centres, with the aversive acting
as the No-US centre for appetitive learning and vice versa. Thus,
there is evidence for (i) a speciﬁc form of inhibition that is
equivalent to (though it may not be instantiated as) a direct
inhibitory link to the stimulus representation (be it CS or US) in
question, and (ii) a more general form of inhibition mediated via
excitatory connections to appetitive/aversive centres that mutually
inhibit one another.
The ‘CS-no-US’ link in conditioned inhibition paradigms could
be the Pavlovian equivalent of a link between the stimulus and a
‘do not respond’ or ‘no response’ representation in negative
priming and response-inhibition paradigms, respectively. Indeed,
some studies indicate that conditioned inhibitory control (as
studied in go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms) can also have
general effects on behaviour. For example, several studies have
found that consistent pairing of food-related pictures to stopping
in a go/no-go or stop-signal-paradigm reduced subsequent food
consumption (Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011; Veling,
Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013). Furthermore,
a similar procedure with alcohol-related stimuli reduced alcohol-
intake in the laboratory (Jones & Field, 2013) and even self-
reported weekly alcohol intake of heavy drinking students
(Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012; but see Jones
and Field (2013)). These effects have been linked to devaluation of
the stop or no-go stimuli as several studies have demonstrated
that stopping responses to stimuli can lead to devaluation of these
stimuli (Houben et al., 2012; Kiss, Raymond, Westoby, Nobre, &
Eimer, 2008; Veling, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008). Ferrey,
Frischen, and Fenske (2012) showed that stop associations not
only impact on the hedonic value of the stimuli associated with
stopping but also on the behavioural incentive of them. They
paired sexually attractive images with either going or stopping in a
training phase, and then asked subjects to rate the attractiveness
of the images. They found that the no-go (stop) images were rated
less positively than the go images. In a second study, Ferrey et al.
showed that subjects were less willing to work to see the erotic
images that were paired with stopping. Thus, conditioned inhibi-
tory control may impact on the motivational value of stimuli,
perhaps via creating links between the stimuli and the appetitive/
aversive centres postulated by Dickinson and Dearing (1979).
To conclude, research on Pavlovian conditioning in animals
(and humans; see e.g. McLaren, Kaye, and Mackintosh (1989))
suggests that a stimulus can become a conditioned inhibitor which
suppresses activation of another (stimulus or response) represen-
tation directly or via a link with a ‘no-US’ or aversive centre that
suppresses appetitive behaviour. Note that these two mechanisms
are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, some have argued that dual-
association formation is the norm (Hall, 2002). The research
focusing on ‘far transfer’ effects of response inhibition suggests
that similar mechanisms may operate when subjects learn to stop
in ‘instrumental’ go/no-go or stop-signal experiments.
4.7. What is learned?
We have reviewed a series of studies and novel empirical
ﬁndings that demonstrate that learning can play an important
role in response inhibition. This could lead to ‘automaticity’ in
stopping, as some experiments have demonstrated that respond-
ing can be suppressed even in the absence of an explicit instruc-
tion, rule, or no-go/stop signal. What is learned is perhaps less
obvious: multiple factors seem to interact with each other (but
again, this is not too different from Pavlovian conditioning; see
Hall (2002)). Here we expand on the general framework offered by
Verbruggen et al. (2014) to provide some characterisation of the
multiple pathways that might allow learning of a stimulus–stop
relationship.
Fig. 4 shows the architecture of the system that we have in
mind. The top portion of the ﬁgure, characterised by the presence
of mediating units, is an associative system running the APECS
algorithm (McLaren, 1993, 2011; McLaren et al., 2012) that takes
stimulus input (whatever is presented) and learns about it (as
discussed in Section 4.4). The black arrows denote possible
associations that can be acquired via the mediating units. We
have not shown either the auto-associative links from the mediat-
ing units back to the cue or stimulus units, or the possible
Pavlovian associations from cues or stimuli to the appetitive or
aversive systems to prevent the ﬁgure from becoming unduly
cluttered.
5 The fact that there is little evidence for relatively long distance inhibitory
connections at the neural level is not an immediate argument invalidating this
architecture, as we can imagine the inhibitory connection being made up of a long-
distance excitatory connection to an inhibitory neurone that operates at a
local level.
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The middle portion of the ﬁgure (the red and green units)
represents the system that implements stopping and going as
instrumental actions, and is adapted from the interactive race
model (Boucher et al., 2007). The stop (in red) and go (in green)
‘response units’ have hard-wired mutually inhibitory connections,
so that when one is activated it suppresses the other (although
there may be an asymmetry, such that the stop unit inhibits the go
unit more than the other way around; see Boucher et al. (2007)).
This inhibitory connection can explain why both going and
stopping are slowed when the stop and go unit are activated
simultaneously (Note that detection of conﬂict could trigger
a general braking mechanism, slowing go RTs further – see, e.g.
Frank, 2006). We also have an excitatory connection from the go
signal to the go unit (i.e. the green arrow), to denote that this
inﬂuence is brought about by means of task instructions and is not
acquired associatively. The stop system has a similar arrangement
that implements the stop signal as a means of stopping. Finally,
cues or stimuli could also become associated directly with the go
and stop units via instructions (i.e. the second pair of red and
green arrows). For example, in a stop-signal task, the primary-task
stimulus would be represented by the cue/stimulus unit, and have
a direct instructionally-mediated link with the ‘go response’ unit.
The lower portion of the system represents the Pavlovian
aversive and appetitive centres described by Dickinson and
Balleine (2002) (see Section 4.6). We see the stop and go systems
as the instrumental equivalents of the Pavlovian aversive and
appetitive systems, and we show this by means of hard-wired
reciprocal excitatory connections between the stop system and the
aversive system, and between the go system and the appetitive
system. Thus, stop and go as actions have intrinsic motivational
qualities by virtue of these connections, and “nice” stimuli will
tend to activate approach (i.e. go) and “nasty” stimuli withdrawal
(via activation of the stop system). Finally, we posit hard-wired
mutually inhibitory links between appetitive and aversive systems
as well (see Section 4.6).
It is immediately apparent from this framework that there are
multiple pathways that will allow a stimulus consistently paired
with stopping to acquire some associatively-mediated inﬂuence
over stopping. A cue or primary-task stimulus in the stop-signal
task that precedes a stop signal may become associated with the
representation of the stop signal, which will then have the effect of
priming the detection of that stop signal and/or the stop system
via the instructionally-mediated pathway between the stop signal
and the stop unit (shown in red). The stimulus will also form a
more direct link to the stop system itself via the appropriate
mediating unit, and in this way may come to act, to some extent,
as a stop signal in its own right. Which associations predominate
after training will depend on the particular contingencies and
schedule in play. Hence, it comes as no surprise that we have been
able to ﬁnd examples of associatively-mediated stopping that
affect performance both as measured by slowing of RTs to go
stimuli and a reduction in errors to stop signals (e.g. Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008b, Experiment 5), and sometimes only seem to affect
performance on stop trials (see Section 4.4). In the latter case, we
hypothesise that the associative pathway involved is the pathway
that predicts and primes the stop signal; consequently, it requires
the presentation of that signal to become effective.
Another implication of this framework is that if a stimulus
becomes associated with stopping, then this may devalue that
stimulus via the stop system's interaction with the aversive
system. This could explain the recent ﬁndings of studies that
focused on inhibitory control training and consumption of food
and alcohol (see above). We might also expect stop training to lead
to persistent activation of the aversive system (perhaps controlled
by contextual cues) leading to a general devaluation of outcomes
experienced in that environment. Our work on the training of
inhibitory control involving gambling is consistent with this
position. We have shown that the stopping motor responses
can reduce gambling (Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012).
A recent series of experiments suggests that this carry-over effect
is not due to a change in cognitive processing style or increased
control. Instead, we hypothesise that stopping generally reduced
approach motivation via the link with the aversive system (Stevens
et al. 2014). The stop/go–aversive/appetitive component of our
framework is based on the work of Dickinson et al. and draws
heavily on the comparative literature. Thus, one corollary of our
proposal is that automatic inhibition or conditioned inhibitory
control may tap into the same mechanisms that are present in
infra-humans. Admittedly, this is still speculative and we are
starting a research programme to explore the similarities and
dissimilarities across species. But for now we can say that it does
offer a parsimonious account that can explain conditioned inhibi-
tion in a variety of species (including humans), why pairing a
signal with stopping leads to slowing/reduced approach, and why
it can result in devaluation.
5. Implications for intentional inhibition
In this article we have focused on response inhibition triggered
(initially) by the presentation of a no-go stimulus or stop signal.
Recent studies have explored to what extent people can also
‘intentionally inhibit’ actions when there is no obvious external
stimulus. Intentional inhibition is an important component of the
‘what, when, whether’ model of intentional action proposed by
Brass and Haggard (2008). In this model, the ‘what’ component
reﬂects the decision of what action to execute; the ‘when’ compo-
nent reﬂects the decision of when to execute the action; and the
‘whether’ component reﬂects the decision to execute the
Fig. 4. A schematic overview of the architecture of the associative stop system. We
combine elements of APECS (top section), the interactive race model (middle
section), and the Konorskian model of motivational systems (bottom section). See
the main text for further details. Excitatory and inhibitory connections are
represented, respectively, by arrows and ﬁlled circles. The red and green connec-
tions represent connections established via instructions; the black connections
represent connections of the associative system. In APECS, the mediating units
(dashed ovals) act as a ‘glue’ to link the stimulus and response representations.
There are also reciprocal connections from these mediating units back to the
inputting units that are not shown in this ﬁgure. It is also quite possible for the cue,
go signal, and stop signal to become associated directly with the appetitive and
aversive system (i.e. Pavlovian conditioning). In this overview, we focus mostly on
the instrumental components of our framework, and so, for clarity, we have not
drawn these connections. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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intentional action or not (Brass & Haggard, 2008, p. 320). If an
action is prepared, deciding not to execute it at the very last minute
may require intentional inhibition according to Brass and Haggard.
The work reviewed in Section 3 shows that go and stop actions
can be primed by information in the environment. Previously we
have proposed that such priming effects can be explained in terms
of an accumulator model in which evidence for an action accu-
mulates until it reaches a threshold (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a).
Both low- and high-visibility primes may inﬂuence the accumula-
tion rates, resulting in an increased probability of selecting the
primed action and shorter decision times when the primed
information is congruent with the selected action, but increased
decision times when the information is incongruent. The accumu-
lation rate is constrained by higher-order goals and task settings,
which can explain why the priming effects depend on task context
(see above). We speculate that priming can inﬂuence the decision
components of the ‘what, when, whether’ model in a similar way.
Schurger, Sitt, and Dehaene (2012) have demonstrated that ‘when’
decisions can be modelled as an accumulation of spontaneous
ﬂuctuations of neural activity, and that an action is executed when
this activity reaches a certain response threshold. It seems likely
that the ‘whether’ component or intentional inhibition can also be
described as the accumulation of information. Based on previous
work, one could therefore hypothesise that information in the
environment could inﬂuence the ‘whether’ decision by altering the
ﬂuctuations of neural activity towards the ‘whether’-decision
thresholds. Of course, one of the deﬁning characteristics of inten-
tional inhibition is that there is no obvious external stimulus or
speciﬁc cue triggering the stopping system. But decisions about
whether or not to act are never made in a ‘vacuum’. Therefore, it
seems likely that multiple sources of information may inﬂuence
our decisions. The priming work of van Gaal et al. (see above) even
suggests that subjects do not have to be aware of such inﬂuences.
Thus, we suggest that even ‘intentional inhibition’ can be primed
by cues in the internal and external environment. Even a small
(unconscious) ‘push’ towards one of the possible action options
may be sufﬁcient to alter behaviour.
In a similar vein, associative processes are likely to inﬂuence the
decision of whether or not to execute an action. We have argued that
subjects will learn associations between stopping and stimuli, task
contexts, or social contexts. This may inﬂuence seemingly ‘intentional’
behaviour. For example, the inhibition of taboo words in certain social
contexts could be a form of automatic inhibition, triggered by
associations between stopping and the taboo word (Severens, Kühn,
Hartsuiker, & Brass, 2011). Thus, when somebody is asked to repeat
a highly insulting word in front of an audience, they might refuse. To
the person, this may seem an intentional decision, but it might be
‘automatically’ triggered by the retrieval of stimulus-‘no’ associations
from long-term memory. More generally, throughout development,
people have been instructed not to do certain things many times;
eventually, they will learn some of this, and this could inﬂuence
decision-making in a direct, automatic fashion. Sequential dependen-
cies, which can inﬂuence the ‘whether’ decision (Schel et al. 2014),
may also be (partly) associatively mediated. After executing an action a
couple of times, subjects may be more (or less) likely to execute the
action again. Such effects may be driven by expectancy or by other
deliberate processes. However, associative learning also seems to play
a role. Work by ourselves and others has demonstrated that such
‘sequential’ effects are at least partly due to associatively mediated
processes (Livesey & Costa, 2014; McAndrew, Yeates, Verbruggen, &
McLaren, 2013; Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006). These
processes can be dissociated from conscious expectancy. For example,
in a choice reaction time task, after a series of B's, subjects indicate that
they expect A (gamblers fallacy), but they respond faster when
another B is presented compared to when an (expected) A is
presented. Such ﬁndings are consistent with a dual-processing
account, which suggests that behaviour is determined by the interac-
tion between a conscious system and an associative system.
Above, we discussed Tzelgov's idea that the difference between
non-automatic behaviour and automatic behaviour is ‘intentionality’,
which refers to setting the task goal and monitoring the task outcome.
Our proposal that priming and associative learning interact with
making the decision to execute an action or not may seem at odds
with this idea. To clarify our position, we have to go back to the
Instance Theory, and the idea that action selection can be construed as
a race between an algorithmic process and a memory-retrieval
process; the process that ﬁnishes ﬁrst determines which action is
selected (see above). When the memory-retrieval process wins the
race, the decision is said to be automatic (Logan, 1988); whereas
decisions based on algorithmic processing are deliberate or inten-
tional. The accumulation process described by Schurger et al. (see
above) could be an example of an algorithmic process, and we had
already discussed how priming could inﬂuence it. Thus, even though
the process itself may be ‘intentional’, non-intentional factors can still
inﬂuence it. Second, in some situations, people may ‘intentionally’ try
to set a goal or make a decision, but the memory-retrieval process can
win the race with the algorithmic process. According to our deﬁnition,
this would make this decision ‘automatic’. However, the person who
makes the decision would probably still consider their decision to be
‘intentional’ as they will only have access to the outcome and not to
how this outcome was achieved.
To conclude, the fact that no external stop signal is presented does
not necessarily imply that priming and learning will not inﬂuence
performance, or that the ‘whether’ decision is less susceptible to
bottom-up priming effects. We have recently argued that the dichot-
omy between automaticity and executive control (as measured in
tasks with external control signals) is a false dichotomy that should be
abandoned (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Instead, we have
proposed that learning associations between stimuli and actions,
and learning which actions lead to reward, are an integral part of
executive control. Similarly, to explain seemingly ‘intentional’ beha-
viour, we should not only look at what is happening in the brain at
a speciﬁc moment, we should also look at what is present in the
current environment and at what happened in the past.
6. Conclusion
The work on priming suggests that response inhibition can be
a prepared reﬂex, readily triggered by information in the environment.
Furthermore, the work on associative learning indicates that response
inhibition can become a learned reﬂex: it may initially depend on top-
down biasing and rely on instruction-based pathways, but it may
gradually become automatised, with the need for top-down bias
disappearing altogether. This should not be taken to imply that
inhibition does not serve an important role in action control. However,
our review does indicate that inhibition can be achieved in various
ways. Therefore, in order to understand how people control their
impulses and urges, we should explore these different possibilities.
Appendix A. Is the response slowing for old stop items due to
top-down goal-shifts or sequential learning?
Methods
Subjects
Forty-six subjects participated for monetary compensation (d6)6.
Two pairs of subjects (i.e. two subjects in the experimental group
6 We had planned to test 48 subjects (24 subjects per group), but two subjects
could not complete the experiment due to technical issues.
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and their yoked controls) were excluded because the percentage of
missed go trials was 40.40 for at least one of the subjects of the
pair. Thus, there were 21 subjects in each group.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented on a 21-inch CRT monitor. The task was
run using PsychToolbox (Version 3; Brainard, 1997). Twenty-eight
lists of 8 words (4 living items, 4 non-living items) were selected.
Fourteen lists were used in the experimental group, and the other
lists were used in the control group7. The lists were matched for
word frequency (SUBTLEXWF; Brysbaert & New, 2009) and word
length (average word frequency: 2.2; average word length: 5.2).
All words were presented in a white lower-case font against a
black background. Subjects had to make living (natural)/non-living
(man-made) judgments about the referents of words. They
responded by pressing the ‘j’ and ‘k’ keys of a QWERTY keyboard
with the index and middle ﬁngers of the right hand, respectively.
The category-response mapping was counterbalanced. The words
appeared above a white ﬁxation line that remained on the screen
during the whole trial. On stop trials, the line turned bold after a
variable stop-signal delay (SSD).
Procedure
In the experimental group, the ﬁrst four stimulus presentations
were ‘training’ (or acquisition) trials; the ﬁfth (ﬁnal) word pre-
sentation was the ‘test’ trial. Stimulus presentation was pseudo-
randomised. First, stop-then-go stimuli (one living item, one non-
living item) were presented on stop trials in the training phase,
and on go trials in the test phase. Second, stop/go-then-go stimuli
(one living item and one non-living item) were presented on both
stop (50%) and go trials in the training phase, and on go trials in
the test phase. Third, stop/go-then-stop stimuli (one living item and
one non-living item) were presented on both stop trials (50%) and
go trials in the training phase, and on stop trials in the test phase.
Fourth, go-then-stop stimuli (one living item and one non-living
item) were presented on go trials in the training phase, and on
stop trials in the test phase. Each stimulus type occurred with
equal probability, so the overall stop-signal probability was .50.
Subjects were neither informed about the different stimulus types
nor about the different phases of the experiment.
Trial presentation was also pseudo-randomised in the control
group. Each subject in the control group was ‘yoked’ to a subject in
the experimental group to determine signal presentation. For
example, when a stop signal was presented on the ﬁrst trial of
the ﬁrst block for Subject 1 in the experiment group, then a stop
signal was presented on the ﬁrst trial of the ﬁrst block for Subject
1 in the control group. In the control group, items were not
consistently associated with stopping in the training phase. We
achieved this by randomly swapping two ‘stop-then-go’ items
with two ‘go-then-stop’ items in the training phase.
All trials started with the presentation of the ﬁxation line (see
Fig. 1 in the main text; FIX interval). After 1000 ms, the stimulus
appeared above the line. The stimulus was removed after 1500 ms
(MAXRT, Fig. 1 main text), regardless of RT. After the stimulus was
removed, the next trial started immediately. On stop trials, the
ﬁxation line turned bold after a variable stop-signal delay (SSD),
instructing subjects to withhold their response. Our previous work
indicates that subjects are less likely to learn stimulus–stop
associations when stopping is unsuccessful (see Verbruggen and
Logan (2008b)). Therefore, SSD was adjusted with a two-up/one-
down staircase procedure (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) based on
the subject's performance on stop/go-then-n items to ensure that
they were able to stop their responses to those items 70% of the
time. The SSDs for the stop-then-go and go-then-stop items were
yoked to the SSD values for stop/go-then-n items. Subjects were
told not to wait for the stop signal and that it would be easy to
stop on the majority of the trials but difﬁcult or impossible to stop
on a minority of the trials.
The experiment consisted of 14 blocks of 40 trials. We used
a new list of 8 words in every block, and each word was presented
ﬁve times per block. To familiarise subjects with the new words,
the whole list was presented at the beginning of the block. After
5 s, the trials started.
Analyses
All data processings and analyses were completed using R
(R Development Core Team, 2014). Proactive response-strategy
adjustments could result in a higher percentage of omitted responses
as well as higher accuracy (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009), so we
distinguished between the proportion of correct go trials [p(correct)]
and the proportion of missed go trials [p(miss)]. Mean reaction time
(RT) on go trials was calculated after removal of incorrect trials.
As we used novel words in each block, outliers could have inﬂuenced
mean RT. Therefore, we detected outlying RTs with the non-
parametric box-and-whisker method (Tukey, 1977) as a function of
stimulus-type and stimulus presentation (1–5) for each subject, and
subsequently removed the trials with outlying values before calculat-
ing the mean RT (o1% of all correct go trials were excluded).
Inclusion of these outliers did not alter the overall pattern of results
in a meaningful way.
In the training phase, we collapsed stop/go-then-go and stop/
go-then-stop items as these were equivalent in this phase. The
mean RT, proportion of correct go trials, proportion of missed
responses [p(miss)] for go trials appear in Table A1. Probability of
responding [p(respond|signal)], and mean SSDs for stop trials
appear in Table A2. The low probability of responding (due to
the two-up/one-down tracking procedure) and high signal prob-
ability ensured that this design was optimal to examine stimulus–
stop learning but made it suboptimal for the estimation of stop
latencies; therefore, SSRTs were not estimated or analysed.
To compare the experimental group and control group, we
contrasted the items types in the experimental group with
performance for items that occurred at the same moment in the
control group. For example, if a stop-then-go item occurred on
trial 38 of block 2 for Subject 1 in the experimental group, then we
labelled the item that occurred on trial 38 of block 2 a ‘stop-then-
go’ item for Subject 1 in the control group.
All data ﬁles and R scripts used for the analyses are deposited in
the Open Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/
10871/15358).
Results
Tables A1 and A2 provide an overview of the go and stop data,
respectively. An overview of the analyses appears in Table A3.
Appendix B. Do subjects learn associations between the
stimulus and the stop signal?
Method
Subjects
Twenty-one students from the University of Exeter participated
for monetary compensation (d10). Two subjects were excluded
from analyses because their percentage of correct go trials was
r50% and one subject was excluded because their percentage of
signal-respond trials was Z50% (a high proportion of correct stop
7 We also considered a within-subjects manipulation. Therefore we created
separate lists for the experimental and control conditions.
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trials may be required for optimal stimulus–stop learning; Ver-
bruggen & Logan, 2008b). Exclusion of these subjects did not
substantially alter the overall pattern of results (see Table B3).
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
We will focus on the differences with the experiment discussed
in Appendix A. We created 24 matched lists of eight words (four
living items and four non-living items). Twelve lists were used in
the ﬁrst experimental session, and the remaining 12 lists were
used in the second experimental session (average word frequency:
2.3; average word length: 5.2). In addition, four lists of eight words
were selected for the practice phase of each session (two lists
per session).
The experiment was run on a PC using Psychtoolbox (Brainard,
1997). The stimuli were projected onto a presentation screen and
Table A1
Overview of the go data. Probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)], probability of a missed go response [p(miss)] and average reaction time as a function of stimulus
type, trial (i.e. stimulus presentations 1–5), and group. Accuracy is the ratio of correct go trials to the number of correct and incorrect go trials (missed trials were excluded).
P(miss) is the ratio of omitted responses to the total number of go trials. M¼mean; sd¼standard deviation.
Condition Stimulus presentation Stimulus type p(correct) p(miss) Reaction times
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Control 1 Stop-then-go 0.93 0.08 0.02 0.05 733 158
Control 1 Stop/go 0.93 0.07 0.03 0.05 725 158
Control 1 Go-then-stop 0.91 0.13 0.01 0.03 720 145
Control 2 Stop-then-go 0.91 0.08 0.02 0.07 725 138
Control 2 Stop/go 0.92 0.08 0.02 0.06 725 152
Control 2 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.08 0.01 0.02 715 152
Control 3 Stop-then-go 0.94 0.08 0.02 0.06 751 166
Control 3 Stop/go 0.92 0.08 0.02 0.04 723 160
Control 3 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.10 0.02 0.06 735 157
Control 4 Stop-then-go 0.95 0.07 0.01 0.02 736 146
Control 4 Stop/go 0.95 0.06 0.02 0.05 739 163
Control 4 Go-then-stop 0.93 0.12 0.02 0.05 726 183
Control 5 Stop-then-go 0.95 0.07 0.03 0.05 731 176
Control 5 Go/stop-then-go 0.94 0.07 0.03 0.07 738 162
Experimental 1 Stop/go 0.91 0.08 0.02 0.03 724 173
Experimental 1 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.07 0.03 0.06 728 179
Experimental 2 Stop/go 0.91 0.08 0.02 0.03 728 187
Experimental 2 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.07 0.03 0.05 709 190
Experimental 3 Stop/go 0.91 0.08 0.03 0.05 724 193
Experimental 3 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.06 0.04 0.07 718 195
Experimental 4 Stop/go 0.91 0.09 0.02 0.04 746 205
Experimental 4 Go-then-stop 0.93 0.06 0.03 0.05 707 191
Experimental 5 Stop-then-go 0.91 0.10 0.04 0.05 749 194
Experimental 5 Stop/go-then-go 0.93 0.06 0.03 0.08 724 193
Table A2
Overview of the stop data. Probability of responding on a stop trial [p(respond|signal)] and average SSD as a function of stimulus presentation (1–5) and stimulus type.
M¼mean; sd¼standard deviation.
Condition Stimulus presentation Stimulus type p(respond|signal) Stop-signal delay
Mean sd Mean sd
Control 1 Stop-then-go 0.40 0.15 382 179
Control 1 Stop/go 0.38 0.07 400 198
Control 1 Go-then-stop 0.33 0.16 389 198
Control 2 Stop-then-go 0.29 0.14 407 198
Control 2 Stop/go 0.28 0.08 384 174
control 2 go-then-stop 0.27 0.11 388 191
Control 3 Stop-then-go 0.28 0.14 399 200
Control 3 Stop/go 0.28 0.07 400 203
Control 3 Go-then-stop 0.32 0.10 402 197
Control 4 Stop-then-go 0.28 0.16 391 201
Control 4 Stop/go 0.33 0.06 380 182
Control 4 Go-then-stop 0.28 0.11 401 191
Control 5 Stop/go-then-stop 0.30 0.09 395 192
Control 5 Go-then-stop 0.30 0.10 406 200
Experimental 1 Stop-then-go 0.42 0.11 395 192
Experimental 1 Stop/go 0.37 0.10 398 194
Experimental 2 Stop-then-go 0.31 0.08 403 195
Experimental 2 Stop/go 0.30 0.06 409 200
Experimental 3 Stop-then-go 0.31 0.11 400 195
Experimental 3 Stop/go 0.28 0.10 398 192
Experimental 4 Stop-then-go 0.29 0.12 404 203
Experimental 4 Stop/go 0.34 0.08 403 191
Experimental 5 Stop/go-then-stop 0.33 0.07 410 204
Experimental 5 Go-then-stop 0.36 0.09 412 206
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viewed via a 451? headcoil-based mirror. All words were pre-
sented in a black lower-case Arial font on a white background.
Subjects responded via button presses of the left (living) and right
(non-living) buttons of a MRI compatible response box using the
index and middle ﬁngers of the right hand, respectively. The
duration of the intertrial interval varied randomly on an expo-
nential distribution with a range of 500–4000 ms and a mean of
1000 ms (as in Lenartowicz et al. (2011)). The screen was blank
during the intertrial interval.
Subjects completed two experimental sessions on consecutive
days. Each session consisted of 12 blocks of 40 trials. New word
lists were used in every block to prevent re-learning. To familiarise
subjects with the new words, the words were presented at the
beginning of each block. After 10 s, the words were removed from
the screen and the ﬁrst trial started.
Analyses
The go and stop data were analysed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs. All analyses were conducted using R (R Development
Core Team, 2014). The training and test phase data were analysed
separately. In the training phase, we collapsed the stop/go-then-go
and the stop/go-then-stop items (as these were equivalent in the
training phase; see Appendix A). Outliers in the RTs were again
detected using the same methods as in Appendix A, and were
removed prior to analysis (4.5% of all correct go trials). Inclusion of
these outliers did not alter the overall pattern of results in a
meaningful way. All data ﬁles and R scripts are deposited in the
Open Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/
10871/15358).
Results
Tables B1 and B2 provide an overview of the go and stop data,
respectively. An overview of the analyses appears in Table B3.
Table A3
Overview of the results of the mixed univariate analyses of variance. For the analysis of the go data in the training phase, we excluded ‘stop-then-go’ items in the control
group. For the analysis of the signal data in the training phase, we excluded ‘go-then-stop’ items in the control group.
df1 df2 SS1 SS2 F p po0.05 Gen. η2
p(correct): training
Condition 1 40 0.008 1.517 0.209 0.650 0.003
Stimulus type 1 40 0.000 0.143 0.115 0.736 0.000
Stimulus presentation 3 120 0.007 0.285 0.993 0.399 0.003
Condition type 1 40 0.012 0.143 3.255 0.079 0.005
Conditionpresentation 3 120 0.006 0.285 0.818 0.487 0.003
Type trial 3 120 0.004 0.319 0.488 0.691 0.002
Condition typepresentation 3 120 0.004 0.319 0.477 0.699 0.002
p(correct): test
Condition 1 40 0.010 0.384 1.053 0.311 0.021
Stimulus type 1 40 0.001 0.083 0.558 0.459 0.002
Condition type 1 40 0.007 0.083 3.458 0.070 0.015
Reaction times: training
Condition 1 40 814 9355295 0.003 0.953 0.000
Stimulus type 1 40 7858 40331 7.793 0.008 n 0.001
Stimulus presentation 3 120 4366 216675 0.806 0.493 0.000
Condition type 1 40 2754 40331 2.731 0.106 0.000
Conditionpresentation 3 120 1604 216675 0.296 0.828 0.000
Typepresentation 3 120 11510 174519 2.638 0.053 0.001
Condition typepresentation 3 120 3683 174519 0.844 0.472 0.000
Reaction times: test
Condition 1 40 58 2606618 0.001 0.976 0.000
Stimulus type 1 40 1541 34109 1.807 0.186 0.001
Condition type 1 40 5488 34109 6.436 0.015 n 0.002
p(respond|signal): training
Condition 1 40 0.014 0.596 0.908 0.346 0.004
Stimulus type 1 40 0.000 0.434 0.023 0.881 0.000
Stimulus presentation 3 120 0.618 1.316 18.775 0.000 n 0.149
Condition type 1 40 0.004 0.434 0.351 0.557 0.001
Conditionpresentation 3 120 0.001 1.316 0.043 0.988 0.000
Typepresentation 3 120 0.078 1.175 2.651 0.052 0.022
Condition typepresentation 3 120 0.006 1.175 0.199 0.897 0.002
p(respond|signal): test
Condition 1 40 0.044 0.380 4.658 0.037 n 0.066
Stimulus type 1 40 0.006 0.245 0.990 0.326 0.010
Condition type 1 40 0.005 0.245 0.802 0.376 0.008
Table B1
Overview of the go data. Probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)],
probability of a missed go response [p(miss)] and average reaction time as a
function of stimulus type and stimulus presentation (1–5). Accuracy is the ratio of
correct go trials to the number of correct and incorrect go trials (missed trials were
excluded). P(miss) is the ratio of omitted responses to the total number of go trials.
M¼mean; sd¼standard deviation.
Stimulus
presentation
Stimulus type p(correct) p(miss) Reaction times
M sd M sd M sd
1 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.07 0.01 0.03 637 138
1 Stop/go-then-n 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.04 646 157
2 Go-then-stop 0.92 0.08 0.02 0.04 641 152
2 Stop/go-then-n 0.92 0.07 0.02 0.06 641 144
3 Go-then-stop 0.91 0.08 0.02 0.05 637 149
3 Stop/go-then-n 0.91 0.07 0.02 0.05 648 160
4 Go-then-stop 0.93 0.10 0.02 0.06 640 150
4 Stop/go-then-n 0.91 0.10 0.02 0.05 649 153
5 Stop-then-go 0.92 0.07 0.02 0.04 657 164
5 Stop/go-then-n 0.91 0.09 0.02 0.06 660 165
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Table B2
Overview of the stop data. Probability of responding on a stop trial [p(respond|signal)] and average SSD as a function of stimulus presentation (1–5) and stimulus type.
M¼mean; sd¼standard deviation.
Stimulus presentation Stimulus type p(respond|signal) Stop-signal delay
M sd M sd
1 Go-then-stop 0.34 0.09 336 151
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4 Go-then-stop 0.28 0.08 352 164
4 Stop/go-then-n 0.32 0.05 347 159
5 Stop-then-go 0.32 0.06 352 165
5 Stop/go-then-n 0.31 0.07 353 163
Table B3
Overview of repeated measures analyses of variance. Stimulus type (stop-then-go, stop/go-then-go, stop/go-then-stop, go-then-stop) and stimulus presentation (1–5) were
within-subjects factors. In the go RT analysis, incorrect and missed go trials were removed. We did not analyse p(miss) because values were low. To account for potential
violations of sphericity, the Huynh–Feldt correction was applied where appropriate (uncorrected degrees of freedom are reported).
df1 df2 SS1 SS2 F p po0.05 Gen. η2
Accuracy: training
Stimulus type 1 17 0.005 0.027 3.031 0.100 0.005
Stimulus presentation 3 51 0.005 0.151 0.585 0.557 0.006
Typepresentation 3 51 0.004 0.075 0.982 0.409 0.005
Accuracy: test
Stimulus type 1 17 0.002 0.024 1.236 0.282 0.008
Reaction times: training
Stimulus type 1 17 1891.088 7718.232 4.165 0.057 0.001
Stimulus presentation 3 51 294.316 47654.248 0.105 0.957 0.000
Typepresentation 3 51 716.074 27855.948 0.437 0.727 0.000
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p(respond|signal): test
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Note that the main effect of stimulus type on p(respond|signal) was marginally signiﬁcant when the three outliers were included (p¼0.056); the main effect of trial on p
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